During the nineteenth century we witness an event that I call the erosion of determinism. At the start of the period we read Laplace, confident that all the world is ruled with the same exact necessity a is found in celestial mechanics. At the end we find C.S. Peirce asserting there is no ground for believing eith doctrine of necessity or for holding that the laws of nature ar represented by precise numerical constants. What he chism"-the idea that we live in a Universe of Chance, became a main theme of his philosophy. Concurrently Emile Durkheim says that the laws of society are probabilistic in nature, and are as inexorable as the laws of gravity. Like the cosmic laws of physics, they act on us from outside of us, and are not reducible to deterministic laws nor to facts about individuals. During this erosion of determinism the once unthinkable world of chance becomes subject to laws of nature. Chance could be allowed no real existence in 1800.
Even those vitalists such as Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) who, in 1800, had thought that living processes could never be predictable nor fa under uniform deterministic laws, did not think that chance itself could be a real, law-governed, and intelligible ingredient of the world Yet by 1900 chance had been tamed and the world of irreducibl probabilistic laws of physics lay near to hand.
The present paper has three parts. 1. It states a paradoxical thesis of Ernst Cassirer that far from determinism slowly being eroded after the time of Laplace, what w call determinism was not even stated until 1872. I shall show that there are some germs of truth in this unlikely suggestion.
2. I shall sketch a silly season for determinism that culminates about 1872: just before that time there was a zany intellectual ferment in discussion of determinism and free will.
3. I shall describe in more detail a problem of what was then called statistical determinism, much vexed in those days.
My point is to illustrate a whole series of conceptual confusions, false starts, and crazy responses. I believe there is a wide-ranging intellectual mutation to which the erosion of determinism is central.
We normally and rightly emp reason, which would here be master probability mathemati fact occur after about 1872. B of unreason that underlies the replacement by new ones.
The Cassirer Thesis. -Laplace's dictum is well known: "All events, even those which, by their insignificance, seem not to follow from the great laws of the universe, follow from them just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun."2 Cassirer says that when Laplace wrote these words, they were "hardly more than an ingenious metaphor."
The idea that the metaphor should be endowed with a wider meaning and validity, that it should be made the expression of a general epistemological principle, occurred in a much later period, and its date can be established quite definitely.3
The date is 1872, the source, a once famous speech by Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818-96), German physicist, chemist, and neurophysiologist. It was delivered in Leipzig to a German scientific and medical association. He spoke "On the limits of the knowledge of nature." The lecture went through many editions and struck many a spark. It was intensely debated in German journals and daily papers.
After quoting Laplace, Du Bois-Reymond gives his own sonorous rendition:
A mind which should know for a given very small period of time the position and movement of all the atoms in the universe, would also necessarily be in a position to derive from these, in accordance with the laws of mechanics, the whole past and future. It could, by an appropriate treatment of its worldformula, tell us who was the Iron Mask, or how the "President" came to grief. As the astronomer predicts the day on which, after many years, a comet again appears in the vault of heaven from the depths of space, so this 'mind' would read in its equations the day when the Greek cross will glitter from the mosque of Sophia, or when England will burn its last lump of coal.4
Du Bois-Reymond was a man of wide learning who contended that in the future the history of science must form the basis of human education and culture. He was a great pioneer who, with Briicke and Helmholtz (1821-94), held that the workings of the brain will be fully understood by the theory of electricity. It was not unusual for him to go out on a limb. You may well imagine that once, when he dismissed Goethe as neither a great scientist nor a literary giant, he aroused some hostility. His 1872 lecture represented an opinion that had been forming steadily over 30 years. He had always contended that physiology and neurology are to be investigated by physical means, chemistry and electricity, but in the lecture he allowed that two matters transcend the realm of human knowledge: the nature of human consciousness and the freedom of the will. No amount of knowledge of the brain can in the end resolve either difficulty. Even the most perfect "Laplacian" science will fail to account for freedom, which yet remains a real felt fact. The grounds for controversy are evident. Materialists, vitalists and theologians were all offended in their own ways. According to Cassirer (see n.3 above) this is the first time in history that our modern concept of determinism was brought into the open and subjected to scrutiny.
Cassirer's claim is a veritable paradox. The great modern philosophical encyclopedias in English, German, French, and Italian all use their articles on determinism to take us back to the ancient world.
Each has its own favorite list of determinists for the modern era. There are some feeble answers. For example the late English philosopher, J. L. Austin, was once asked, "There is more than one distinct doctrine of determinism, do you not agree, Professor Austin?" "No," he answered tartly, "less than one."5 Cassirer might be telling us that a particularly interesting kind of determinism becomes current in 1872. Or he might be saying that before 1872 there was never such a clear concept of determinism as is elucidated by Du Bois-Reymond. But I propose to treat Cassirer quite seriously, as holding that a fundamental transition occurred in 1872. Just when I say determinism was rapidly being eroded, he says that it is being invented or at least universalized and made literal for the first time.
The Word "Determinism"-The article "Determinism" in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas begins by telling us English word 'determinism,' like its French, German, a counterparts, is of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century c 5 owe the anecdote to G.E.M. Anscombe.
6 Alan Donagan, "Determinism," Dictionary of the History ofIdeas, 5 vols. York, 1972) , II, 18. The article rightly distinguishes "two different, but relat trines. One, the doctrine that choice between different courses of action can cases, be fully accounted for by psychological and other conditions.... other ... is the doctrine that everything that happens constitutes a chain of tion." The word is used in the first sense in the 1780s but I doubt that it is used i second sense until the 1850s at earliest. 
19TH-CENTURY CRACKS IN CONCEPT OF DETERMINISM 459
Determinism is the principle of determining the will from sufficient internal (subjective) reasons. To obtain this principle with that of freedom, i.e., absolute spontaneity, occasions no difficulty.11
In short, the word "determinism" does not occur in German or English until the very end of the eighteenth century, and then it is not used in the sense attached to it by Du Bois-Reymond. I am less confident about French. The word occurs in 1811 in a French version of Gall and Spurzheim's phrenology.12 The acerbic words of the 1836 supplement, quoted at the head of the present essay, make pretty plain that the word has not caught on.
All French scholars will immediately associate the word determinisme with Claude Bernard, and in particular with his immensely influential 1865 Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. 13
Bernard certainly gave vigorous currency to the word. He used it in a rather active sense. Compare our English word "mechanism." That has been used as the name of the doctrine that everything is caused by mechanical means. But we also speak of the mechanism of a watch, i.e., that which actually brings about the movement. "Determinisme" for Bernard denotes that which actually does the determining, although he also holds, as a doctrine that came to be known as Determinisme, that there is such a determining for every physiological event.14 This is in part an anti-vitalist opinion. 13 Claude Bernard, Introduction a l'etude de la medecine experimentale, (Paris, 1865), passim.
14 For the first sense, "Le m6decin experimenteur exercera successivement son influence sur les maladies des qu'il en connaitre exp6rimentalement le d6terminisme exact, c'est a dire la cause prochaine," 376. For the second sense, "La critique experimentale met tout en doute, excepte le principe du d6terminisme scientifique." 303. For a hostile account of Bernard's claims to have introduced the word, and for a critique of his doctrine of determinisme, see the article "Determinisme" in A. Dechambre, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences medicales (tome 28, 1883), 435-49. journal, largely written by him appeared almost weekly betwe to a more leisurely monthly p French neo-Kantianism. He f purged of noumena.
The second volume of Reno was first published in 1859 an passion, liberty, probability an rences of our word.15 It is less c there we do find mention of t du determinisme." 16 Moreover in the book, Renouvier explici statement of the forms of dete explicitly "modern" than tha quotation of Laplace refutes determinism was completely ig think Cassirer has directed ou let us say between 1854 and 1 quired its modern sense in all t credibility to the improbable c of determinism comes into bei A more modest statement of William James, who gave us terminism. The soft determinist thinks that free will and determinism may be reconciled, while the hard determinist rejects free will. James began his famous lecture, "The Dilemma of Determinism" by saying that "We see in the writings of Renouvier, Fouillee and Delbouef how completely changed and refreshed is the form of all the old disputes" 18 about free will. One of his early essays was a review of the second edition of Renouvier's Essaies critiques, 19 so in 1876 James is using the word "determinism" in his review. Renouvier published James in his house journal. In his 1904 presidential address to the American Psychological Association, James declared his debts to 15 Charles Renouvier, Essais de critique generate. Deuxieme essaie. L'Homme: la raison, la passion, la liberte, la certitude, la probability morale. Paris, 1859; e.g., Renouvier.20 One debt is surely his usage of the word "determinism."
The OED gives 1876 as the first occurrence of this modern use, defined as "the doctrine that everything that happens is determined by a necessary chain of causation." This is doubtless too late. In a discussion of 11 February 1873, to which I shall return, James Clerk Maxwell (1831-79) used the word in its modern sense.21 By 1870 it seems to have become fixed in the language, but it was not so in 1860.
In 1865, J.S. Mill grudgingly made use of the word which he took from Sir William Hamilton.22 Such clusterings around a date do no harm to the Cassirer thesis. Of course, absence of a word never proves absence of the corresponding idea. In his 1873 discussion Maxwell spoke interchangeably of "the opinion of Necessity" and "Determinism." That name, "The doctrine of necessity," is a standard phrase of eighteenth-century discussions of free will. Moreover Holbach called himself a "materialist" and La Mettrie a "mechanist" and I would not discount those authors as propounding versions of "modern" determinism.
Finally there is the fact that cognates of the word "determinism" do occur even in the seventeenth century. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that Erdmann's 1840 edition of Leibniz includes the word "determinism" in the index. Now the word does not occur in Leibniz's texts themselves, but we do find ample use of "dete tion", "determine", and the like, in contexts connected with f I believe the case can be made that these usages are different f modern sense of the word distinguished by the OED and imp noticed by Cassirer. They have more to do with the idea of d ness, of something having a determinate value, than with a n chain of causation. Full exploration of such niceties of languag lead us further afield. We are, in the light of these complex But even if we do not quite agree with Cassirer, let us grant tha he has directed our attention in an unexpected direction. At the very least we shall say with James that in the 1860s the old discussions ar completely changed and refreshed. Yet I am not so sure "refreshed is quite the right word. Just at that period very serious and clever people start producing a whole range of completely queer but ne arguments about determinism. I believe this to be another aspect of Cassirer's thesis.
Laplace-Before proceeding to the silly season for determini we must reconsider the case of Laplace. Was his celebrated deter ist dictum only a metaphor, as Cassirer has it? I think not. It occ of course, in the work on probability, not the celestial mechanics, it is used on quite a few different occasions throughout the whol Laplace's creative life. The purpose, I believe, is to assert that in physical realm there is no such thing as chance. Chance, as Hume put it, is a matter of hidden and secret causes. Indeed that philoso is at one with the applied mathematician, writing in his Treatise As in the case of Leibniz, we note even the very verb "determin'd." But Hume quite explicitly writes of external bodies in this connection, and not of mental events. Likewise Laplace implicitly refers only to external bodies. If we are to save the thesis of Cassirer, we should not hold fast to his feeble claim that Laplace wrote only metaphorically. Instead let us guess that Laplace was not fully dissociated from a kind of dualism. In the world of extended substance, of external bodies, everything is "determined." That entirely leaves open the question of mental substance. Even Kant found his place for freedom in the world of mental substance, although he uses the terminology of noumena. Perhaps that is why he was so offended by the neologism of "Determinismus" which, he said, ought to be "Praedeterminismus." Determinismus was invoked for a prior determination of motives in the mental realm, parallel to that of causes in the physical realm. Now Laplace did write about human freedom, but few of his ideas seem to have survived. It is possible that current research by Professor Roger Hahn of Berkeley will tell us Laplace's views on freedom. In the meantime we can let the Cassirer thesis fit the available phenomena. It was possible for Laplace, like Kant and Hume, to be a determinist about external bodies but not about the mind.
At this juncture Du Bois-Reymond's own branch of science be comes of central importance. He was an electroneurologist, a member of the 1847 Berlin group that proclaimed it would never allow merely mental causation in the study of the brain. The 1872 lecture was confession of doubt, of limitation about that program. Central to the program was an out and out materialism: everything mental is to be understood in terms of the material. Du Bois-Reymond was no dualist. Nor, to all intents and purposes was his French counterpart, the physiologist Bernard, who gave our word prominence in French. It is precisely the explicit materialism and the medical investigation of th human mind and body by chemical and electrical means which generated the new form of determinism.
Indeed, let us recall that the hegemony of determinism had never been absolute. There were always those students of the human body and of living matter in general, called vitalists. They rejected th Laplacian dictum from the start. In 1795 Laplace gave his famou introductory lectures on probability that became his Essai philosophique sur les probabilites. Laplace told his audience that for a being with sufficient knowledge of general laws, and a temporal slice of th universe, everything else would be completely predictable. In lecture in the School of Medicine across the street, Xavier Bichat (commonl called the founder of histology) was to reject all of that:
We calculate the fall of a heavy body, the motion of the planets, the cours of a river, the ascension of a projectile, and so forth: the rule being once found, it is only necessary to make the application to each particular case Thus heavy bodies fall in a series of odd numbers; attraction is in the inver ratio of the squares of the distances, and so on. On the other hand all the vital functions are susceptible of numerous variations. They are frequently out o their natural state; they defy every kind of calculation, for it would be necessary to have as many rules as there are different cases. It is impossibl to foresee, predict or calculate anything with regard to their phenomena. Saint-Venant may have been riding the wrong horse, but he was a man of genius. He and his pupil Boussinesq were fascinated by the investigation of singular solutions of certain fundamental equations. Very roughly speaking, by inserting different values arbitrarily close to zero, one would produce enormously different effects. This, said Saint-Venant, is how free will intersects with a completely mechanistic universe. (There is more than a whiff of catastrophe theory in this research.)
In the 1873 paper alluded to above, Clerk Maxwell states just this solution to the problem of free will. He adds, however, that "singular points are by their nature very isolated, and form no appreciable fraction of the continuous course of existence." 26 C.W.F. Everitt, the experimental physicist and Maxwell scholar, suggested to me that Maxwell had in mind his great personal difficulty in choosing which of two women to marry: a singular point in his life, but a rare one. In the recently published lectures on the history of probability which Karl Pearson gave 50 years ago, Pearson says, "I hold a letter of Clerk Maxwell in which he states" of Saint-Venant and Boussinesq "that their work on Singular Solutions is epoch-making" on account of its being "the great solution to the problem of freewill." 27
This story exemplifies several things. First, here is a completely new idea. Secondly, it is embraced by some of the most powerful minds of the age. Thirdly, it appears to involve mind and matter in a new and intimate way: singular solutions about atomic point forces will create just the empty spot at which to locate human freedom. Fourthly, this idea is completely crazy: it tries to fit a square peg of human freedom into the round hole of singular solutions. When great minds took to a new but crazy idea, we may suspect their very thinking about a concept was undergoing a lot of stress. I contend that the stress in the concept of determinism was as widespread as could be. Indeed in his fascinating discussion on that evening of February 1873, Maxwell laid before his friends his own worries about the relation between the statistical and the dynamic conception of both hu being and of matter, referring alike to statistical mechanics an Henry Buckle, the great proponent of statistical determinism tory, whom I discuss at the end of this essay.
Renouvier and the law of large numbers -The name "law of numbers" is still used loosely in probability theory, although the now so many different theorems that one needs better names, w usually clump around what we now call the central limit the S.D. Poisson introduced the name "law of large numbers" in and it plays a major role in his probability analysis of decision jury.28 He reminds us of the theorem of James Bernoulli, publis 1713. It tells us the connection between the probability of a ki event, and the probable results of repeated trials. For example, 26 Op. cit., 444, note 21. free acts. This is because viewed externally, a free act is indistinguishable from a ticket in a lottery. The law of large numbers teaches that absolute regularity emerges in a long run of draws. Hence deterministic regularity can be explained on the basis of freedom.
Renouvier next attacks the determinist who holds that there must be a deterministic explanation of each alleged free act, based on a multiplicity of complex causes. I have remarked that Renouvier quoted the Laplacian dictum on determinism as readily as Du BoisReymond. His attitude to it is, however formed from this philosophical position of antinomy. Laplace's "exposition of principles," he wrote, "entirely conforms to the spirit of science, or, perhaps better, to the spirit of scientists, all or almost all of whom are quite ready to avow or reproduce this principle. You find a clear and concise notion of probability (the same that I develop in my categories) but disfigured by a profession of faith in necessity, which seems to me, at the very least, useless and in consequence arbitrary."32 He then made the standard positivistic move, saying that just as final causes have been eliminated from science, so must we eliminate efficient causes too.
Renouvier thus illustrates the philosopher taking snippets of current science and weaving them into a thoroughly new form of a traditional free will antinomy. In terms of direct influence he is important.
He rehearsed many of the arguments that appear, in more cogent form, 35 years later when Charles S. Peirce re-examined the doctrine of necessity. But whereas Renouvier was attempting a philosophical construct, a Kantian antinomy derived from contemporary science, Peirce is content to use one side of the arguments to demolish determinism.33 I cannot positively assert that Peirce got these ideas from Renouvier. We do know that William James was the only person who well recognized the genius of Peirce, and was his chief Cambridge supporter. I have remarked already on James's close contacts with Renouvier. Another French contact is Emile Boutroux, a younger Statistical indeterminism -Having provided two examples of the way in which scientific results were somewhat zanily imported into the free will debate, I now pass to a longer-lived example that is far closer to the evolution of probability. There was a confused idea in circulation in the 1930s that quantum indeterminacy would provide room for free will. Statistical determinism is the exact opposite: when the laws of the world turn statistical, the elbow room for free will is diminished, if not eliminated.
The idea of law-like regularities in the ratios of birth and death is an old one, widely known after the publication, for example, of John Graunt's 1662 analysis of the London Bills of Mortality. What of regularities in the moral domain, where we appear concerned with the choices freely made by individuals? The eighteenth-century French economists were sure that there must be economic laws as rigid as Newton's celestial mechanics. It was increasingly understood that this must have something to do with probability, and it was foreseen that stable empirical frequencies would be essential to any study of law in the moral sciences. This became the popular wisdom of the intelligentsia. Thus by 1790 Madame de Stael noted the stability of divorce rates in certain Swiss cantons and inferred that these indicate laws in the moral realm.36 Yet any such reflections are patchy until there are systematic published data. Only in the 1820s did Paris and the department of Seine begin to publish statistics for the hospitals, suicides, crimes and so forth. In 1825 the French department of justice began its judicial statistics, counting and classifying kinds of crime and rates of conviction. Then began an avalanche of printed numbers.
Before then, only Scandinavia had any systematic tabulations of social facts, and although the data collected by Lutheran pastors have proven a godsend for twentieth century historians of demography, their potential was hardly realized at the time. After a few years it looked as if there were remarkable stabilities.
Even if the quantity of deviancy was increasing at a terrifying rate, its distribution was uniform, so that the proportion of Frenchmen who committed suicide in the several months followed a sinusoidal curve; the proportion who used carbon monoxide inhalation as opposed to swallowing a poison was stable. The ratio of the different methods of suicide in different countries was equally striking. The English, for example, preferred hanging and drowning to the French poisoning.
By 1828 Adolphe Quetelet announced a theme that would exercise even the popular imagination for fifty years: "The terrifying exactness with which crimes reproduce themselves."37 Quetelet was to become the most influential popularizer of the bureaucratic practice and the systematic science of statistics. We know in advance, "how many men will bloody their hands with violent murders, how many will be counterfeiters, how many poisoners, just as one can enumerate in advance the births and deaths that will occur in a given year."38 Or again in 1832:
We have a sort of French national budget of the scaffold, whose regularity is, without doubt, more reliable than the French financial budget.39
Ten years later it was realized that there was more stability in the moral domain than in procreation and mortality, and, as I have remarked, it was beginning to be suspected that there might be a mathematical reason for this. There was a fascination with the fact that although "nothing would seem more to escape foreknowledge than murder,"40 in fact the frequency distribution of kinds of murders, and instruments used, is amazingly stable. It was inferred that "the annual crime rates are a necessary consequence of our social order,"41 and could be changed only by amending the social order itself.
Society prepares the crimes and the guilty person is only the instru- This obsession with crime is n great cities were more consc
The new industrialized cities cr Nor was crime the only field rise above individual horrors; epidemics, and death. Less terri of marriage and divorce, so tha and hate.
Such observations created something of a crisis. To quote one author among many, d'Angeville wrote in 1836 that "the moral order falls in the domain of statistics ... a discouraging fact for those who believe in the perfectibility of human nature. It seems as if free will exists only in theory.43 Quetelet rightly replied that we do not have to deny that free will applies to individuals, so long as we agree that it has no influence when we consider social phenomena in a general way. His model came from mechanics, for he was himself first an astronomer. Statistical stability resembles the way in which changes internal to a system may leave its center of gravity unmoved. As the astronomers say, there may be perturbations in the system, but then it returns to equilibrium, a model which Quetelet applied to the revolutionary periods of 1830 and 1848.44 Such loose analogies were woven in with Poisson-style laws of large numbers and a conception of the Gaussian curve of errors (the so-called Normal law of probability much admired by Quetelet) which was thought to be the product of a large number of irregular tiny causes smoothed out over the long run
These conjectures [about the stability of crime and other social pathologies] which appear sinister to many people, are in fact deducible from the first principles of probability.45
The project was to show that irregularity-and "hence" freedom for individuals-not only was consistent with but actually entailed large scale uniformity. No such deduction was ever published but it provided a standard source of problems. One required a mathematical explanation of the facts of stability in order to destroy the ogre of determinism. After all, suicide is a mortal sin, the worst, for it is the only one from which one cannot repent. If the proportion of suicides in an arrondissement is fixed, is it not determined that so many will kill themselves next year? How then can they be free? Quetelet and the rest strove to prove they could be free, and yet the population necessarily would exhibit the statistical regularity. A great tradition of probability mathematics arises from this kind of problem: Poisson, Bienayme, Lexis, Bortkeiwicz, Czuber, and even Poincare. It provides an essential core for understanding a good deal of the history of mathematical probability, but here I reflect on the ramifications in social philosophy.
One of the most important books of the 1850s was Henry Thomas
Buckle's History of Civilization in England, intended as a mighty introduction to the history of civilization which he never lived to complete. 46 Here was a man whose knowledge was deemed encyclopedic even by the highest standards of Victorian learning, who was the lion of the London Season when his book was published in 1857, when he was 36, and whose book instantly took hold in every European language. It is a massive work about historical determinism. I cannot excel the 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica in summarizing one of the three chief theses in its entry on Buckle:
While the theological doctrine of predestination is a barren hypothesis beyond the province of knowledge, and the metaphysical doctrine of free will rests on an erroneous belief in the infallibility of consciousness, it is proved by science, and especially by statistics, that human actions are governed by laws as fixed and regular as those which rule the physical world.
Maxwell, in the discussion to which I have already alluded twice said that "The statistical method of investigating social questions has Laplace for its most scientific and Buckle for its most popular expounder."47 The gentlest, wisest refutation of Buckle's statistical determinism is provided by John Venn, the logician, economist, and student of probability. 48 The most practical is briefly given by William Farr, the brain of the Registrar General's office for England and Wales, and architect of much modern statistical bureaucracy. In his introductory address to the International Statistical Congress held in London three years after Buckle had made his triumphal debut, he agreed that the laws are deterministic:
Despite the accidents of conflag tainties of life and the variation fires, wrecks and deaths depen gravitation, and fluctuate withi bilities can determine beforehand . . . This holds of crimes and other acts of the will, so that violation itself is subject to law.49
Yet Farr, a resource man for the great philanthropic and utilitarian reformers, did not succumb to Buckle's fatalism.
Shall a system of fatalism be built upon this foundation . . ? No, for statistics has revealed a law of variation.
Thus far he speaks like Quetelet. But in addition we, the good gov nors, can change the boundary conditions:
Introduce a system of ventilation into unventilated mines, you substitute law of accidents for another ... As men have the power to change the conditions of life, and even to modify their race, they have the power to change the current of human actions within definite limits which statistics can determine.
Our task as bureaucrats is to see how we can change the conditions under which they, the workers, or especially those called les miserables, shall fulfill the laws of their existence. Perhaps it took an artist to understand the nature of utilitarian philanthropic statistics.
Dickens' finest novel, Hard Times, is a tract against utilitarianism and statistics ("stutterings" as the heroine wonderfully calls them in a great passage). The horrendous Gradgrind has taught in his school the doctrine of statistical law. By the end of his novel his horrid son, Tom, has become a thief.
"If a thunderbolt had fallen upon me," said the father, "it would have shocked me less than this." "I don't see why," grumbled the son. "So many people are employed situations of trust; so many people, out of so many, will be dishonest. I h heard you talk, a hundred times, of its being a law. 53 In 1864 the young economist, Adolf Wagner was sufficiently taken with these ideas to present a vivid version of such determinism.54 His intent, I suspect, was only to repeat Farr's vision of the way in which the legislator will change the boundary conditions of the immutable statistical laws that govern the behavior of people. Wagner was, however, taken up by a generation of German philosophers who were discussing the free will problem anew, under the aegis of neo-Kantianism. Several minor figures did take the view that the new statistics was the final proof of philosophical determinism. So they had to be countered in turn, and they were met by a series of heated rebuttals, of which the most important was due to M.W. Drobisch. He had already reviewed Quetelet unfavorably for his mistaken philosophical assumptions, and in 1867 wrote a tract against Wagner and every other statistical determinist. There is however an unnoticed empirical difference between Drobisch and Quetelet. Quetelet had some reason to think that human statistics betray an amazing stability. Drobish, writing later, and with more data, can see that this just is not true-there are many domains of wide variation. Thus it was that the German mathematicians of the late nineteenth century were the first to devise mathematical tests of dispersion and goodness of fit. This important mathematical work arises from the intersection of philosophical qualms and richer empirical data.
The French school of social statistics had tended to think of populations acted upon from the outside, subject to some law of nature which imposed itself on individuals. That seems to create some sort of a problem of free will. Durkheim's social realism, and his doctrine of sociological laws, is the culm sequent German school proce probabilities to individuals, which show how large scale ho geneity, Poisson and Bienayme German mathematicians to com on to some central aspects of a curious example of how go social and even moral proble Conclusion -Cassirer was wr body-and-mind causal determini 1872, but he pointed to a rem terminism that reached a clim "determinism" became genera before then, and in German i during the same period. The lit in which bits of mathematics shelf to make room for freed largely forgotten, turned the statistical determinism. Exactl work by Marx would speak of "the natural laws of capitalist production ... of these tendencies winning their way through and working themselves out with iron necessity."56 I believe that Cassirer almost inadvertently pointed to a period of tumult and chaos in thought about necessity and determinism. He was right to say that something new was afoot, but it was not merely a clear concept of determinism. It was an event that went hand in hand with the taming of chance. By the 1870s statistical workers were for the first time able to regard chance as an autonomous aspect of the world and subject to mathematical analysis. Chance could go into the regular modelling of aspects of the world, as well as become a tool of inference.57 Instead of a blemish caused by ignorance, the most famous distribution of chances, the Gaussian or Normal curve, would be, in the words of Francis Galton, "the law . . . which reigns with serenity and in complete self-effacement amidst the wildest confusion . . . the supreme law of Unreason." 8 Thus at the very moment that Cassirer's concept of determinism came into being, fully structured, chance was becoming tamed. If we understand determinism in a larger sense, so that it embraces Laplace, Holbach, La Mettrie, and perhaps Hobbes, then just when Cassirer's concept was fully definite, the erosion of determinism was fully under way, and we were about to enter a "Universe of Chance."
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